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Filename: 311-relay-ipv6-reachability.txt
Title: Tor Relay IPv6 Reachability
Author: teor, Nick Mathewson
Created: 22-January-2020
Status: Accepted
Ticket: #24404

0. Abstract

   We propose that Tor relays (and bridges) should check the reachability of
   their IPv6 ORPort, before deciding whether to publish their descriptor. To
   check IPv6 ORPort reachability, relays and bridges need to be able to
   extend circuits via other relays, and back to their own IPv6 ORPort.

1. Introduction

   Tor relays (and bridges) currently check the reachability of their IPv4
   ORPort and DirPort before publishing them in their descriptor. But relays
   and bridges do not test the reachability of their IPv6 ORPorts.

   However, directory authorities make direct connections to relay IPv4 and
   IPv6 ORPorts, to test each relay's reachability. Once a relay has been
   confirmed as reachable by a majority of authorities, it is included in the
   consensus. (Currently, 6 out of 9 directory authorities perform IPv4 and
   IPv6 reachability checks. The others just check IPv4.)

   The Bridge authority makes direct connections to bridge IPv4 ORPorts, to
   test each bridge's reachability. Depending on its configuration, it may also
   test IPv6 ORPorts. Once a bridge has been confirmed as reachable by the
   bridge authority, it is included in the bridge networkstatus used by
   BridgeDB.

   Many relay (and bridge) operators don't know when their relay's IPv6 ORPort
   is unreachable. They might not find out until they check [Relay Search], or
   their traffic may drop. For new operators, it might just look like Tor
   simply isn't working, or it isn't using much traffic. IPv6 ORPort issues
   are a significant source of relay operator support requests.

   Implementing IPv6 ORPort reachability checks will provide immediate, direct
   feedback to operators in the relay's logs. It also enables future work,
   such as automatically discovering relay and bridge addresses for IPv6
   ORPorts (see [Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address]).

2. Scope

   This proposal modifies Tor's behaviour as follows:

   Relays (including directory authorities):
   * circuit extension,
   * OR connections for circuit extension,
   * reachability testing.

   Bridges:
   * reachability testing only.

   This proposal does not change client behaviour.

   Throughout this proposal, "relays" includes directory authorities, except
   where they are specifically excluded. "relays" does not include bridges,
   except where they are specifically included. (The first mention of "relays"
   in each section should specifically exclude or include these other roles.)

   When this proposal describes Tor's current behaviour, it covers all
   supported Tor versions (0.3.5.7 to 0.4.2.5), as of January 2020, except
   where another version is specifically mentioned.

3. Allow Relay IPv6 Extends

   To check IPv6 ORPort reachability, relays and bridges need to be able to
   extend circuits via other relays, and back to their own IPv6 ORPort.

   We propose that relays start to extend some circuits over IPv6 connections.
   We do not propose any changes to bridge extend behaviour.

3.1. Current IPv6 ORPort Implementation

   Currently, all relays (and bridges) must have an IPv4 ORPort. IPv6 ORPorts
   are optional.

   Tor supports making direct IPv6 OR connections:
     * from directory authorities to relay ORPorts,
     * from the bridge authority to bridge ORPorts,
     * from clients to relay and bridge ORPorts.

   Tor relays and bridges accept IPv6 ORPort connections. But IPv6 ORPorts are
   not currently included in extend requests to other relays. And even if an
   extend cell contains an IPv6 ORPort, bridges and relays will not extend
   via an IPv6 connection to another relay.

   Instead, relays will extend circuits:
     * Using an existing authenticated connection to the requested relay
       (which is typically over IPv4), or
     * Over a new connection via the IPv4 ORPort in an extend cell.

   If a relay receives an extend cell that only contains an IPv6 ORPort, the
   extend typically fails.

3.2. Relays Extend to IPv6 ORPorts

   We propose that relays make some connections via the IPv6 ORPorts in
   extend cells.

   Relays will extend circuits:
     * using an existing authenticated connection to the requested relay
       (which may be over IPv4 or IPv6), or
     * over a new connection via the IPv4 or IPv6 ORPort in an extend cell.

   Since bridges try to imitate client behaviour, they will not adopt this new
   behaviour, until clients begin routinely connecting via IPv6. (See
   [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections].)

3.2.1. Making IPv6 ORPort Extend Connections

   Relays may make a new connection over IPv6 when:
     * they have an IPv6 ORPort,
     * there is no existing authenticated connection to the requested relay,
       and
     * the extend cell contains an IPv6 ORPort.

   If these conditions are satisfied, and the extend cell also contains an
   IPv4 ORPort, we propose that the relay choose between an IPv4 and an IPv6
   connection at random.

   If the extend cell does not contain an IPv4 ORPort, we propose that the
   relay connects over IPv6. (Relays should support IPv6-only extend cells,
   even though they are not used to test relay reachability in this proposal.)

   A successful IPv6 connection also requires that:
     * the requested relay has an IPv6 ORPort.
   But extending relays must not check the consensus for other relays' IPv6
   information. Consensuses may be out of date, particularly when relays are
   doing reachability checks for new IPv6 ORPorts.

   See section 3.3.2 for other situations where IPv6 information may be
   incorrect or unavailable.

3.2.2. No Tor Client Changes

   Tor clients currently include IPv4 ORPorts in their extend cells, but they
   do not include IPv6 ORPorts.

   We do not propose any client IPv6 extend cell changes at this time.

   The Tor network needs more IPv6 relays, before clients can safely use
   IPv6 extends. (Relays do not require anonymity, so they can safely use
   IPv6 extends to test their own reachability.)

   We also recommend prioritising client to relay IPv6 connections
   (see [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections]) over relay to relay IPv6
   connections. Because client IPv6 connections have a direct impact on users.

3.3. Alternative Extend Designs

   We briefly mention some potential extend designs, and the reasons that
   they were not used in this proposal.

   (Some designs may be proposed for future Tor versions, but are not necessary
   at this time.)

3.3.1. Future Relay IPv6 Extend Behaviour

   Random selection of extend ORPorts is a simple design, which supports IPv6
   ORPort reachability checks.

   However, it is not the most efficient design when:
     * both relays meet the requirements for IPv4 and IPv6 extends,
     * a new connection is required,
     * the relays have either IPv4 or IPv6 connectivity, but not both.

   In this very specific case, this proposal results in an average of 1
   circuit extend failure per new connection. (Because relays do not try to
   connect to the other ORPort when the first one fails.)

   If relays try both the IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts, then the circuit would
   succeed. For example, relays could try the alternative port after a 250ms
   delay, as in [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections]. The design in
   this proposal results in an average circuit delay of up to 125ms
   (250ms / 2) per new connection, rather than failure.

   However, partial relay connectivity should be uncommon. And relays keep
   connections open long-term, so new relay connections are a small proportion
   of extend requests.

   Therefore, we defer implementing any more complex designs. Since we propose
   to use IPv6 extends to test relay reachability, occasional circuit extend
   failures have a very minor impact.

3.3.2. Future Bridge IPv6 Extend Behaviour

   When clients automatically connect to relay IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts by
   default, bridges should also adopt this behaviour. (For example,
   see [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections].)

3.3.3. Allowing Extends to Prefer IPv4 or IPv6

   Here is an alternate design, which allows extending clients (or relays doing
   reachability tests) to prefer either IPv4 or IPv6:

   Suppose that a relay's extend cell contains the IPv4 address and the
   IPv6 address in their _preferred order_.  So if the party generating
   the extend cell would prefer an IPv4 connection, it puts the IPv4
   addess first; if it would prefer an IPv6 connection, it puts the IPv6
   address first.

   The relay that receives the extend cell could respond in several ways:
     * One possibility (similar to section 3.2.1) is to choose at random,
       with a higher probability given to the first option.
     * One possibility (similar to section 3.3.1) is to try the first, and
       then try the second if the first one fails.

   This scheme has some advantage, in that it lets the self-testing relay say
   "please try IPv6 if you can" or "please try IPv4 if you can" in a reliable
   way, and lets us migrate from the current behavior to the 3.3.1 behavior
   down the road.

   However, it might not be necessary: clients should not care if their
   extends are over IPv4 or IPv6, they just want to get to an exit safely.
   (And clients should not depend on using IPv4 or IPv6, because relays may
   use an existing authenticated connection to extend.) The only use case
   where extends might want to prefer IPv4 or IPv6 is relay reachability
   tests. But we want our reachability test design to succeed, without
   depending on the specific extend implementation.

3.4. Rejected Extend Designs

   Some designs may never be suitable for the Tor network.

   We rejected designs where relays check the consensus to see if other
   relays support IPv6, because:
     * relays may have different consensuses,
     * the extend cell may have been created using a version of the
       [Onion Service Protocol] which supports IPv6, or
     * the extend cell may be from a relay that has just added IPv6, and is
       testing the reachability of its own ORPort (see Section 4).

   We avoided designs where relays try to learn if other relays support IPv6,
   because these designs:
     * are more complex than random selection,
     * potentially leak information between different client circuits,
     * may enable denial of service attacks, where a flood of incorrect extend
       cells causes a relay to believe that another relay is unreachable on an
       ORPort that actually works, and
     * require careful tuning to match the typical interval at which network
       connectivity is actually changing.

4. Check Relay and Bridge IPv6 ORPort Reachability

   We propose that relays (and bridges) check their own IPv6 ORPort
   reachability.

   To check IPv6 ORPort reachability, relays (and bridges) extend circuits via
   other relays (but not other bridges), and back to their own IPv6 ORPort.

   If IPv6 reachability checks fail, relays (and bridges) should refuse to
   publish their descriptors, if they believe IPv6 reachability checks are
   reliable, and their IPv6 address was explicitly configured. (See
   [Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address] for the ways relays can guess their
   IPv6 addresses.)

   Directory authorities always publish their descriptors.

4.1. Current Reachability Implementation

   Relays and bridges check the reachability of their IPv4 ORPorts and
   DirPorts, and refuse to publish their descriptor if either reachability
   check fails. (Directory authorities test their own reachability, but they
   only warn, and publish their descriptor regardless of reachability.)

   IPv4 ORPort reachability checks succeed when any create cell is received on
   any inbound OR connection. The check succeeds, even if the cell is from an
   IPv6 ORPort, or a circuit built by a client.

   Directory authorities make direct connections to relay IPv4 and IPv6
   ORPorts, to test each relay's reachability. Relays that fail either
   reachability test, on enough directory authorities, are excluded from the
   consensus.

   The Bridge authority makes direct connections to bridge IPv4 ORPorts, to
   test each bridge's reachability. Depending on its configuration, it may also
   test IPv6 ORPorts. Bridges that fail either reachability test are excluded
   from BridgeDB.

4.2. Checking IPv6 ORPort Reachability

   We propose that testing relays (and bridges) select some IPv6 extend-capable
   relays for their reachability circuits, and include their own IPv4 and IPv6
   ORPorts in the final extend cells on those circuits.

   The final extending relay will extend to the testing relay:
     * using an existing authenticated connection to the testing relay
       (which may be over IPv4 or IPv6), or
     * over a new connection via the IPv4 or IPv6 ORPort in the extend cell.

   The testing relay will confirm that test circuits can extend to both its
   IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts.

   Checking IPv6 ORPort reachability will create extra IPv6 connections on the
   tor network. (See [Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics].) It won't directly
   create much extra traffic, because reachability circuits don't send many
   cells. But some client circuits may use the IPv6 connections created by
   relay reachability self-tests.

4.2.1. Selecting the Final Extending Relay

   IPv6 ORPort reachability checks require an IPv6 extend-capable relay as
   the second-last hop of reachability circuits. (The testing relay is the
   last hop.)

   IPv6-extend capable relays must have:
     * Relay subprotocol version 3 (or later), and
     * an IPv6 ORPort.
   (See section 5.1 for the definition of Relay subprotocol version 3.)

   The other relays in the path do not require any particular protocol
   versions.

4.2.2. Extending from the Second-Last Hop

   IPv6 ORPort reachability circuits should put the IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in
   the extend cell for the final extend in reachability circuits.

   Supplying both ORPorts makes these extend cells indistinguishable from
   future client extend cells.

   If reachability succeeds, the testing relay (or bridge) will accept the
   final extend on one of its ORPorts, selected at random by the extending
   relay (see section 3.2.1).

4.2.3. Separate IPv4 and IPv6 Reachability Flags

   Testing relays (and bridges) will record reachability separately for IPv4
   and IPv6 ORPorts, based on the ORPort that the test circuit was received on.

   Here is a reliable way to do reachability self-tests for each ORPort:

   1. Check for create cells on inbound ORPort connections from other relays

   Check for a cell on any IPv4 and any IPv6 ORPort. (We can't know which
   listener(s) correspond to the advertised ORPorts, particularly when using
   port forwarding.) Make sure the cell was received on an inbound OR
   connection, and make sure the connection is authenticated to another relay.
   (Rather than to a client: clients don't authenticate.)

   2. Check for created cells from testing circuits on outbound OR connections

   Check for a returned created cell on our IPv4 and IPv6 self-test circuits.
   Make sure those circuits were on outbound OR connections.

   By combining these tests, we confirm that we can:
     * reach our own ORPorts with testing circuits,
     * send and receive cells via inbound OR connections to our own ORPorts
       from other relays, and
     * send and receive cells via outbound OR connections to other relays'
       ORPorts.

   Once we validate the created cell, we have confirmed that the final remote
   relay has our private keys. Therefore, this test reliably detects ORPort
   reachability, in most cases.

   There are a few exceptions:

   A. Duplicate Relay Keys

   Duplicate keys are only possible if a relay's private keys have been copied
   to another relay. That's either a misconfiguration, or a security issue.
   Directory authorities ensure that only one relay with each key is included
   in the consensus.

   If a relay was set up using a copy of another relay's keys, then its
   reachability self-tests might connect to that other relay. (If the second
   hop in a testing circuit has an existing OR connection to the other relay.)

   Relays could test if the inbound create cells they receive, match the
   create cells that they have sent on self-test circuits.

   But this seems like unnecessary complexity, because duplicate keys are
   rare. At best, it would provide a warning for some operators who have
   accidentally duplicated their keys. (But it doesn't provide any extra
   security, because operators can disable self-tests using AssumeReachable.)

   B. Multiple ORPorts in an Address Family

   Some relays have multiple IPv4 ORPorts, or multiple IPv6 ORPorts. In some
   cases, only some ports are reachable. (This configuration is uncommon, but
   multiple ORPorts are supported.)

   Here is how these tests can pass, even if the advertised ORPort is
   unreachable:
     * the final extend cell contains the advertised IPv6 address of the
       self-testing relay,
     * if the extending relay already has a connection to a working NoAdvertise
       ORPort, it may use that connection instead.

4.2.4. No Changes to DirPort Reachability

   We do not propose any changes to relay IPv4 DirPort reachability checks at
   this time.

   The following configurations are currently not supported:
     * bridge DirPorts, and
     * relay IPv6 DirPorts.
   Therefore, they are also out of scope for this proposal.

4.3. Refusing to Publish Descriptor if IPv6 ORPort is Unreachable

   If an IPv6 ORPort reachability check fails, relays (and bridges) should log
   a warning.

   If IPv6 reachability checks fail, relays (and bridges) should refuse to
   publish their descriptors, if they believe IPv6 reachability checks are
   reliable, and their IPv6 address was explicitly configured. (See
   [Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address] for the ways relays can guess their
   IPv6 addresses.)

   Directory authorities always publish their descriptors.

4.3.1. Refusing to Publish the Descriptor

   If IPv6 reachability checks fail, relays (and bridges) should refuse to
   publish their descriptors, if:
     * enough existing relays support IPv6 extends, and
     * the IPv6 address was explicitly configured by the operator
       (rather than guessed using [Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address]).

   Directory authorities may perform reachability checks, and warn if those
   checks fail. But they always publish their descriptors.

   We set a threshold of consensus relays for reliable IPv6 ORPort checks:
     * at least 30 relays, and
     * at least 1% of the total consensus weight,
   must support IPv6 extends.

   We chose these parameters so that the number of relays is triple the
   number of directory authorities, and the consensus weight is high enough
   to support occasional reachability circuits.

   In small networks with:
     * less than 2000 relays, or
     * a total consensus weight of zero,
   the threshold should be the minimum tor network size to test reachability:
     * at least 2 relays, excluding this relay.
   (Note: we may increase this threshold to 3 or 4 relays if we discover a
   higher minimum during testing.)

   If the current consensus satisfies this threshold, testing relays (and
   bridges, but not directory authorities) that fail IPv6 ORPort reachability
   checks should refuse to publish their descriptors.

   To ensure an accurate threshold, testing relays should exclude:
     * the testing relay itself, and
     * relays that they will not use in testing circuits,
   from the:
     * relay count, and
     * the numerator of the threshold percentage.

   Typically, relays will be excluded if they are in the testing relay's:
     * family,
     * IPv4 address /16 network,
     * IPv6 address /32 network (a requirement as of Tor 0.4.0.1-alpha),
   unless EnforceDistinctSubnets is 0.

   As a useful side-effect, these different thresholds for each relay family
   will reduce the likelihood of the network flapping around the threshold.

   If flapping has an impact on the network health, directory authorities
   should set the AssumeIPv6Reachable consensus parameter. (See the next
   section.)

4.3.2. Add AssumeIPv6Reachable Option

   We add an AssumeIPv6Reachable torrc option and consensus parameter.

   If IPv6 ORPort checks have bugs that impact the health of the network,
   they can be disabled by setting AssumeIPv6Reachable=1 in the consensus
   parameters.

   If IPv6 ORPort checks have bugs that impact a particular relay (or bridge),
   they can be disabled by setting "AssumeIPv6Reachable 1" in the relay's
   torrc.

   This option disables IPv6 ORPort reachability checks, so relays publish
   their descriptors if their IPv4 ORPort reachability checks succeed.
   (Unlike AssumeReachable, AssumeIPv6Reachable has no effect on the existing
   dirauth IPv6 reachability checks, which connect directly to relay ORPorts.)

   The default for the torrc option is "auto", which checks the consensus
   parameter. If the consensus parameter is not set, the default is "0".

   "AssumeReachable 1" overrides all values of "AssumeIPv6Reachable",
   disabling both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPort reachability checks. Tor should warn if
   AssumeReachable is 1, but AssumeIPv6Reachable is 0. (On directory
   authorities, "AssumeReachable 1" also disables dirauth IPv4 and IPv6
   reachability checks, which connect directly to relay ORPorts.
   AssumeIPv6Reachable does not disable directory authority to relay IPv6
   checks.)

4.4. Optional Efficiency and Reliability Changes

   We propose some optional changes for efficiency and reliability, and
   describe their impact.

   Some of these changes may be more appropriate in future releases, or
   along with other proposed features.

4.4.1. Extend IPv6 From All Supported Second-Last Hops

   The testing relay (or bridge) puts both IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in its final
   extend cell, and the receiving ORPort is selected at random by the
   extending relay (see sections 3.2.1 and 4.2). Therefore, approximately half
   of IPv6 ORPort reachability circuits will actually end up confirming IPv4
   ORPort reachability.

   We propose this optional change, to improve the rate of IPv6 ORPort
   reachability checks:

   If the second-last hop of an IPv4 ORPort reachability circuit supports IPv6
   extends, testing relays may put the IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in the extend
   cell for the final extend.

   As the number of relays that support IPv6 extends increases, this change
   will increase the number of IPv6 reachability confirmations. In the ideal
   case, where the entire network supports IPv4 and IPv6 extends, IPv4 and IPv6
   ORPort reachability checks would require a similar number of circuits.

4.4.2. Close Existing Connections Before Testing Reachability

   When a busy relay is performing reachability checks, it may already have
   established inbound or outbound connections to the second-last hop in its
   reachability test circuits. The extending relay may use these connections
   for the extend, rather than opening a connection to the target ORPort
   (see sections 3.2 and 4.2.2).

   Bridges only establish outbound connections to other relays, and only over
   IPv4 (except for reachability test circuits). So they are still potentially
   affected by this issue.

   We propose these optional changes, to improve the efficiency of IPv4 and
   IPv6 ORPort reachability checks:

   Testing relays (and bridges):
     * close any outbound connections to the second-last hop of reachability
       circuits, and
     * close inbound connections to the second-last hop of reachability
       circuits, if those connections are not using the target ORPort.

   Even though it is unlikely that bridges will have inbound connections to
   a non-target ORPort, bridges should still do inbound connection checks, for
   consistency.

   These changes are particularly important if a relay is connected to all
   other relays in the network, but only over IPv4. (Or in the future, only
   over IPv6.)

   We expect that these changes will slightly increase the number of relay
   re-connections, but reduce the number of reachability test circuits
   required to confirm reachability.

4.4.3. Accurately Identifying Test Circuits

   The testing relay (or bridge) may confirm that the create cells it is
   receiving are from its own test circuits, and that test circuits are
   capable of returning create cells to the origin.

   Currently, relays confirm reachability if any create cell is received on
   any inbound connection (see section 4.1). Relays do not check that the
   circuit is a reachability test circuit, and they do not wait to receive the
   return created cell. This behaviour has resulted in difficult to diagnose
   bugs on some rare relay configurations.

   We propose these optional changes, to improve the efficiency of IPv4 and
   IPv6 ORPort reachability checks:

   Testing relays may:
     * check that the create cell is received from a test circuit
       (by comparing the received cell to the cells sent by test circuits),
     * check that the create cell is received on an inbound connection
       (this is existing behaviour),
     * if the create cell from a test circuit is received on an outbound
       connection, destroy the circuit (rather than returning a created cell),
       and
     * check that the created cell is returned to the relay on a test circuit
       (by comparing the remote address of the final hop on the circuit, to
       the local IPv4 and IPv6 ORPort addresses).

   Relays can efficiently match inbound create cells to test circuits by
   storing a set of their test circuits' extend cells g^X values, and then
   check incoming cells create cells against that set.

   If we make these changes, relays should track whether they are
   "maybe reachable" (under the current definition of 'reachable') and
   "definitely reachable" (based on the new definition). They should log
   different messages depending on whether they are "maybe reachable" but these
   new tests fail, or whether they are completely unreachable.

4.4.4. Allowing More Relay IPv6 Extends

   Currently, clients, relays, and bridges do not include IPv6 ORPorts in their
   extend cells.

   In this proposal, we only make relays (and bridges) extend over IPv6 on
   the final hop of test circuits. This limited use of IPv6 extends means that
   IPv6 connections will still be uncommon.

   We propose these optional changes, to increase the number of IPv6
   connections between relays:

   To increase the number of IPv6 connections, relays that support IPv6
   extends may want to use them for all hops of their own circuits. Relays
   make their own circuits for reachability tests, bandwidth tests, and
   ongoing preemptive circuits. (Bridges can not change their behaviour,
   because they try to imitate clients.)

   We propose a torrc option and consensus parameter RelaySendIPv6Extends,
   which is only supported on relays (and not bridges or clients). This option
   makes relays send IPv4 and IPv6 ORPorts in all their extend cells, when
   supported by the extending and receiving relay. (See section 3.2.1.)

   The default value for this option is "auto", which checks the consensus
   parameter. If the consensus parameter is not set, it defaults to "0" in
   the initial release.

   Once IPv6 extends have had enough testing, we may enable
   SendIPv6CircuitExtends on the network. The consensus parameter will be set
   to 1. The default will be changed to "1" (if the consensus parameter is not
   set).

   We defer any client (and bridge) changes to a separate proposal, to be
   implemented when there are more IPv6 relays in the network. But we note
   that relay IPv6 extends will provide some cover traffic when clients
   eventually use IPv6 extends in their circuits.

   As a useful side effect, increasing the number of IPv6 connections in the
   network makes it more likely that an existing connection can be used for
   the final hop of a relay IPv6 ORPort reachability check.

4.4.5. Relay Bandwidth Self-Tests Over IPv4 and IPv6

   In this proposal, we only make relays (and bridges) use IPv6 for their
   reachability self-tests.

   We propose this optional change, to improve the accuracy of relay (and
   bridge) bandwidth self-tests:

   Relays (and bridges) perform bandwidth self-tests over IPv4 and IPv6.

   If we implement good abstractions for relay self-tests, then this change
   will not need much extra code.

   If we implement IPv6 extends for all relay circuits (see section 4.4.4),
   then this change will effectively be redundant.

   Doing relay bandwidth self-tests over IPv6 will create extra IPv6
   connections and IPv6 bandwidth on the tor network. (See
   [Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics].) In addition, some client circuits
   may use the IPv6 connections created by relay bandwidth self-tests.

4.5. Alternate Reachability Designs

   We briefly mention some potential reachability designs, and the reasons that
   they were not used in this proposal.

4.5.1. Removing IPv4 ORPorts from Extend Cells

   We avoid designs that only include IPv6 ORPorts in extend cells, and remove
   IPv4 ORPorts.

   Only including the IPv6 ORPort would provide slightly more specific
   reachability check circuits. However, we don't need IPv6-only designs,
   because relays continue trying different reachability circuits until they
   confirm reachability.

   IPv6-only designs also make it easy to distinguish relay reachability extend
   cells from other extend cells. This distinguisher will become more of an
   issue as IPv6 extends become more common in the network (see sections 4.2.2
   and 4.4.4).

   Removing the IPv4 ORPort also provides no fallback, if the IPv6 ORPort is
   actually unreachable. IPv6-only failures do not affect reachability checks,
   but they will become important in the future, as other circuit types start
   using IPv6 extends.

   IPv6-only reachability designs also increase the number of special cases in
   the implementation. (And the likelihood of subtle bugs.)

   These designs may be appropriate in future, when there are IPv6-only bridges
   or relays.

5. New Relay Subprotocol Version

   We reserve Tor subprotocol "Relay=3" for tor versions where:
     * relays may perform IPv6 extends, and
     * bridges might not perform IPv6 extends,
   as described in this proposal.

5.1. Tor Specification Changes

   We propose the following changes to the [Tor Specification], once this
   proposal is implemented.

   Adding a new Relay subprotocol version lets testing relays identify other
   relays that support IPv6 extends. It also allows us to eventually recommend
   or require support for IPv6 extends on all relays.

   Append to the Relay version 2 subprotocol specification:

          Relay=2 has limited IPv6 support:
            * Clients might not include IPv6 ORPorts in EXTEND2 cells.
            * Relays (and bridges) might not initiate IPv6 connections in
              response to EXTEND2 cells containing IPv6 ORPorts, even if they
              are configured with an IPv6 ORPort.
          However, relays accept inbound connections to their IPv6 ORPorts,
          and will extend circuits via those connections.

   "3" -- relays support extending over IPv6 connections in response to an
          EXTEND2 cell containing an IPv6 ORPort.

          Bridges might not extend over IPv6, because they try to imitate
          client behaviour.

          A successful IPv6 extend requires:
            * Relay subprotocol version 3 (or later) on the extending relay,
            * an IPv6 ORPort on the extending relay,
            * an IPv6 ORPort for the accepting relay in the EXTEND2 cell, and
            * an IPv6 ORPort on the accepting relay.
          (Because different tor instances can have different views of the
          network, these checks should be done when the path is selected.
          Extending relays should only check local IPv6 information, before
          attempting the extend.)

          When relays receive an EXTEND2 cell containing both an IPv4 and an
          IPv6 ORPort, and there is no existing authenticated connection with
          the target relay, the extending relay may choose between IPv4 and
          IPv6 at random. The extending relay might not try the other address,
          if the first connection fails.
          (TODO: check final behaviour after code is merged.)

          As is the case with other subprotocol versions, tor advertises,
          recommends, or requires support for this protocol version, regardless
          of its current configuration.

          In particular:
            * relays without an IPv6 ORPort, and
            * tor instances that are not relays,
          have the following behaviour, regardless of their configuration:
            * advertise support for "Relay=3" in their descriptor
              (if they are a relay, bridge, or directory authority), and
            * react to consensuses recommending or requiring support for
              "Relay=3".

          This subprotocol version is described in proposal 311, and
          implemented in Tor 0.4.4.1-alpha.
          (TODO: check version after code is merged).

6. Test Plan

   We provide a quick summary of our testing plans.

6.1. Test IPv6 ORPort Reachability and Extends

   We propose to test these changes using chutney networks with AssumeReachable
   disabled. (Chutney currently enables AssumeReachable by default.)

   We also propose to test these changes on the public network with a small
   number of relays and bridges.

   Once these changes are merged, volunteer relay and bridge operators will be
   able to test them by:
     * compiling from source,
     * running nightly builds, or
     * running alpha releases.

6.2. Test Existing Features

   We will modify and test these existing features:
     * IPv4 ORPort reachability checks

   We do not plan on modifying these existing features:
     * relay reachability retries
       TODO: Do relays re-check their own reachability? How often?
     * relay canonical connections
     * "too many connections" warning logs
   But we will test that they continue to function correctly, and fix any bugs
   triggered by the modifications in this proposal.

6.3. Test Legacy Relay Compatibility

   We will also test IPv6 extends from newer relays (which implement this
   proposal) to older relays (which do not). Although this proposal does not
   create these kinds of circuits, we need to check for bugs and excessive
   logs in older tor versions.

7. Ongoing Monitoring

   To monitor the impact of these changes:
     * relays should collect basic IPv6 connection statistics, and
     * relays and bridges should collect basic IPv6 bandwidth statistics.
   (See [Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics]).

   Some of these statistics may be included in tor's heartbeat logs, making
   them accessible to relay operators.

   We do not propose to collect additional statistics on:
     * circuit counts, or
     * failure rates.
   Collecting statistics like these could impact user privacy.

   We also plan to write a script to calculate the number of IPv6 relays in
   the consensus. This script will help us monitor the network during the
   deployment of these new IPv6 features.

8. Changes to Other Proposals

   [Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections] needs to be modified to keep
   bridge IPv6 behaviour in sync with client IPv6 behaviour. (See section
   3.3.2.)

References:

[Onion Service Protocol]:
   In particular, Version 3 of the Onion Service Protocol supports IPv6:
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/rend-spec-v3.txt

[Proposal 306: Client Auto IPv6 Connections]:
   One possible design for automatic client IPv4 and IPv6 connections is at:
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/306-ipv6-happy-eyeballs.txt
   (TODO: modify to include bridge changes with client changes)

[Proposal 312: Relay Auto IPv6 Address]:
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/312-relay-auto-ipv6-addr.txt

[Proposal 313: Relay IPv6 Statistics]:
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/proposals/313-relay-ipv6-stats.txt

[Relay Search]:
   https://metrics.torproject.org/rs.html

[Tor Specification]:
   https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/tor-spec.txt
```