``` Filename: 191-mitm-bridge-detection-resistance.txt Title: Bridge Detection Resistance against MITM-capable Adversaries Author: George Kadianakis Created: 07 Nov 2011 Status: Obsolete 1. Overview Proposals 187, 189 and 190 make the first steps toward scanning resistant bridges. They attempt to block attacks from censoring adversaries who provoke bridges into speaking the Tor protocol. An attack vector that hasn't been explored in those previous proposals is that of an adversary capable of performing Man In The Middle attacks to Tor clients. At the moment, Tor clients using the v3 link protocol have no way to detect such an MITM attack, and will gladly send a VERSIONS or AUTHORIZE cell to the MITMed connection, thereby revealing the Tor protocol and thus the bridge. This proposal introduces a way for clients to detect an MITMed SSL connection, allowing them to protect against the above attack. 2. Motivation When the v3 link handshake protocol is performed, Tor's SSL handshake is performed with the server sending a self-signed certificate and the client blindly accepting it. This allows the adversary to perform an MITM attack. A Tor client must detect the MITM attack before he initiates the Tor protocol by sending a VERSIONS or AUTHORIZE cell. A good moment to detect such an MITM attack is during the SSL handshake. To achieve that, bridge operators provide their bridge users with a hash digest of the public-key certificate their bridge is using for SSL. Bridge clients store that hash digest locally and associate it with that specific bridge. Bridge clients who have "pinned" a bridge to a certificate "fingerprint" can thereafter validate that their SSL connection peer is the intended bridge. Of course, the hash digest must be provided to users out-of-band and before the actual SSL handshake. Usually, the bridge operator gives the hash digest to her bridge users along with the rest of the bridge credentials, like the bridge's address and port. 3. Security implications Bridge clients who have pinned a bridge to a certificate fingerprint will be able to detect an MITMing adversary in time. If after detection they act as an innocuous Internet client, they can successfully remove suspicion from the SSL connection and subvert bridge detection. Pinning a certificate fingerprint and detecting an MITMing attacker does not automatically alleviate suspicions from the bridge or the client. Clients must have a behavior to follow after detecting the MITM attack so that they look like innocent Netizens. This proposal does not try to specify such a behavior. Implementation and use of this scheme does not render bridges and clients immune to scanning or DPI attacks. This scheme should be used along with bridge client authorization schemes like the ones detailed in proposal 190. 4. Tor Implementation 4.1. Certificate fingerprint creation The certificate fingerprints used on this scheme MUST be computed by applying the SHA256 cryptographic hash function upon the ASN.1 DER encoding of a public-key certificate, then truncating the hash output to 12 bytes, encoding it to RFC4648 Base32 and omitting any trailing padding '='. 4.2. Bridge side implementation Tor bridge implementations SHOULD provide a command line option that exports a fully equipped Bridge line containing the bridge address and port, the link certificate fingerprint, and any other enabled Bridge options, so that bridge operators can easily send it to their users. In the case of expiring SSL certificates, Tor bridge implementations SHOULD warn the bridge operator a sensible amount of time before the expiration, so that she can warn her clients and potentially rotate the certificate herself. 4.3. Client side implementation Tor client implementations MUST extend their Bridge line format to support bridge SSL certificate fingerprints. The new format is: Bridge [["keyid="]] \ ["shared_secret="] ["link_cert_fpr="] where is the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint. Tor clients who use bridges and want to pin their SSL certificates must specify the bridge's SSL certificate fingerprint as in: Bridge 12.34.56.78 shared_secret=934caff420aa7852b855 \ link_cert_fpr=GM4GEMBXGEZGKOJQMJSWINZSHFSGMOBRMYZGCMQ 4.4. Implementation prerequisites Tor bridges currently rotate their SSL certificates every 2 hours. This not only acts as a fingerprint for the bridges, but it also acts as a blocker for this proposal. Tor trac ticket #4390 and proposal YYY were created to resolve this issue. 5. Other ideas 5.1. Certificate tagging using a shared secret Another idea worth considering is having the bridge use the shared secret from proposal 190 to embed a "secret message" on her certificate, which could only be understood by a client who knows that shared secret, essentially authenticating the bridge. Specifically, the bridge would "tag" the Serial Number (or any other covert field) of her certificate with the (potentially truncated) HMAC of her link public key, using the shared secret of proposal 190 as the key: HMAC(shared_secret, link_public_key). A client knowing the shared secret would be able to verify the 'link_public_key' and authenticate the bridge, and since the Serial Number field is usually composed of random bytes a probing attacker would not notice the "tagging" of the certificate. Arguments for this scheme are that it: a) doesn't need extra bridge credentials apart from the shared secret of prop190. b) doesn't need any maintenance in case of certificate expiration. Arguments against this scheme are: a) In the case of self-signed certificates, OpenSSL creates an 8-bytes random Serial number, and we would probably need something more than 8-bytes to tag. There are not many other covert fields in SSL certificates mutable by vanilla OpenSSL. b) It complicates the scheme, and if not implemented and researched wisely it might also make it fingerprintable. c) We most probably won't be able to tag CA-signed certificates. 6. Discussion 6.1. In section 4.1, why do you truncate the SHA256 output to 12 bytes?! Bridge credentials are frequently propagated by word of mouth or are physically written down, which renders the occult Base64 encoding unsatisfactory. The 104 characters Base32 encoding or the 64 characters hex representation of the SHA256 output would also be too much bloat. By truncating the SHA256 output to 12 bytes and encoding it with Base32, we get 39 characters of readable and easy to transcribe output, and sufficient security. Finally, dividing '39' by the golden ratio gives us about 24.10! 7. Acknowledgements Thanks to Robert Ransom for his great help and suggestions on devising this scheme and writing this proposal! ```